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or do they believe representatives should deliver resources to their 
community and help individuals with problems? Do they expect both? 
In Latin America surveys typically show that popular evaluations of 
the national congress are overwhelmingly negative but are not able 
to explain why. Are congresses held in low esteem because people 
think that congress is not legislating well or efficiently overseeing 
the executive, or because citizens do not know what legislators are 
supposed to do and want them to deliver pork for their district and 
personalistic benefits for themselves? Since clientelism targets the 
poor and plays an important role in elections in developing democ-
racies, it is important to know if poor citizens truly have different 
views than wealthier citizens about what a member of congress 
should do once elected. We use quasi-experimental procedures 
in a public opinion survey administered in Mexico City to begin to 
address these questions. Our findings indicate that poorer citizens, 
people with no or very little education, have greater expectations of 
clientelism than wealthier citizens but that their view of a legislator’s 
job is more subtle, and more democratic than would be predicted 
by clientelism theory.
síntesis: ¿Cómo perciben los ciudadanos la labor de los legisla-
dores? ¿Se piensa que los representantes deben legislar y supervisar 
la labor del Ejecutivo? ¿O se cree que los representantes deben llevar 
recursos a las comunidades y ayudar a individuos con sus proble-
mas? ¿O se esperan ambas cosas? En América Latina, la mayoría de 
las encuestas muestran una opinión negativa generalizada de los 
congresos nacionales, pero no explican la razón de ello. ¿La pobre 
evaluación ciudadana tiene que ver con la creencia de que los con-
gresos no legislan bien o no supervisan eficientemente el trabajo 
del Ejecutivo? ¿O es más bien porque los ciudadanos desconocen lo 
que debe de hacer un legislador y esperan beneficios propios y para 
sus comunidades? Como el clientelismo se focaliza en los pobres 
y juega un papel importante en las elecciones de democracias en 
desarrollo, es relevante saber si los individuos de menores recursos 
tienen opiniones significativamente diferentes que los de mayores 
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recursos en relación con lo que deben hacer los legisladores una vez 
elegidos. Nuestro ensayo intenta responder estas preguntas usando 
una encuesta en la ciudad de México con un diseño cuasiexperimen-
tal. Nuestros hallazgos muestran que las personas sin educación, o 
con una educación básica, tienen mayores expectativas clientelares 
que ciudadanos de mayores niveles educativos, pero que su visión 
de los legisladores es más sutil y más democrática de lo que predice 
la teoría del clientelismo.
1. Introduction
What do citizens expect of legislators? Constitutions 
in presidential democracies typically give a congress the 
power to develop legislation, pass laws, and oversee the exe-
cutive. Constitutions also commonly assert that members 
of congress should act as “representatives of the people.” 
What does it mean to the mass public for congress members 
to be their representatives? Do they think that the job of a 
member of congress is to legislate, supervise the executi-
ve, and work on legislative committees? Alternatively, do 
they expect legislators to attend to their individual needs, 
bring resources to the community, and stay in touch with 
the district? Do they want some combination of the above?
These questions are particularly important for less 
established democracies where the regime needs to build 
popular affective support that will sustain democracy -so 
that democracy is understood to not just be the “only game 
in town” but the best game in town (Easton, 1975; Linz and 
Stepan, 1996, p. 15; Lagos, 2003). If people expect their 
elected representatives to do a job that is different from the 
job outlined in the constitution then their dissatisfaction 
may become a destabilizing factor. Public opinion surveys 
in Latin America show that the congress is held in low regard 
(see Table 1). Such opinions may stem from misaligned 
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expectations, and might help explain decreasing support 
for democracy overall.
Interviews conducted with state legislators in Nuevo 
León and Veracruz, Mexico in 2005 show that state le-
gislators see their job as legislating, supervising the use 
of public monies, and assisting constituents.5 However, 
when deputies were asked “What do the people of your 
district (your state) think is the job of a deputy?” 79% of the 
deputies interviewed in Nuevo León, and 62% in Veracruz 
explained that people want assistance in receiving govern-
ment services, benefits for themselves and public works for 
their neighborhood.6 They went on to explain that many 
people do not understand that such work is the job of the 
municipal government. Deputies from both states said 
that the people, particularly poor people, think deputies 
are “little mayors.”
Table 1. Confidence in Democracy and Democratic 
Institutions in Latin America (Percent from all 18 Latin 
American countries included in the Latinobarometer surveys)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Satisfaction 
w/democracy 
(very or fairly 
satisfied)
37 25 33 29 29 31 38 46 37 44
Democracy is 
preferable to 
any other kind 
of government
57 48 56 53 53 53 58 55 57 59
5 Interviews were conducted with 14 of the 40 members of the Nuevo León 
state legislature, and 29 of the 50 deputies in Veracruz. Interviews were 
roughly in proportion to party representation in each legislature, and to 
the number of deputies elected from single member districts and from 
party lists.
6 Deputies elected from all major parties and by single member districts 
and party lists offered this assessment.
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Have a lot or some confidence in:
National 
Congress 28 24 23 17 24 28 28 29 31 34
President 39 30 -- 31 37 43 47 43 -- --
Judiciary 34 27 25 20 32 31 36 30 28 32
Political 
Parties 20 19 14 11 18 19 22 20 21 24
Number of 
respondents 18135 18135 18552 18658 19605 20206 20232 20212 20204 20204
Source: Lagos, 2003: Tables 7.2, 7.4, and 7.5; Latinobarometer 
Report, 2005, pp. 56-60; Latinobarometer, 2006-2009 Surveys.
Note: Before 2004 the Latinobarometer survey covered 17 coun-
tries, the Dominican Republic entered the survey in 2004.
Deputies also said that people are not aware of the 
legislative function of the Congress, or that they don’t know 
that deputies make laws. When asked whether people of 
different classes have different ideas about their job, some 
deputies said that it is primarily poor people who want 
personal assistance and poor and middle class people 
want public works for their communities. Some deputies 
explained that middle and upper class people were more 
likely to be aware that legislating is a deputy’s job, though 
not all deputies expressed this view.
When a country makes a transition to democracy 
it is not clear how citizens are supposed to learn what 
elected officials are intended to do. In Mexico during the 
many decades of hegemony by the PRI (Institutionalized 
Revolutionary Party), a façade of democracy was established 
that included elections with multiple parties, legislatures 
that rubberstamped executive initiatives, and clientelistic 
campaigning and personal favours directed to voters. By 
1997 the PRI’s hegemony ended in national government 
but institutions, such as elections and legislatures have 
not been redesigned. Consequently, it is quite likely that 
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many citizens are uncertain what the job of a democrati-
cally elected legislator is supposed to entail. Several state 
legislators in fact said during interviews that in the past 
deputies did not legislate or check the executive, they only 
provided public works to communities, and that this is part 
of the reason why people do not now understand the job 
of a deputy in a plural, democratic legislature.
A long history of clientelism is another reason why 
citizens may have conceptions of the job of legislators that 
clash with the needs of a checks-and-balances system. 
Clientelism is a “contingent exchange of political support 
for targeted benefits” and patrons maintain the support of 
clients by helping them with their personal needs, giving 
handouts, and bringing local club goods such as infrastruc-
ture projects to communities of loyal supporters (Kitschelt 
and Wilkinson, 2007, p. 324). In Mexico, poor people in 
particular are expected to view elected officials as patrons. If 
they do, how do poor people evaluate a deputy who spends 
time developing bills and checking the executive, instead 
of providing clientelistic benefits to supporters?
We conducted a survey in Mexico City in July 2008 to 
explore what citizens think the job of legislators should be, 
and if opinions vary with socioeconomic status. This survey 
includes conventional-style survey questions and an em-
bedded experimental component. In this paper we provide 
a brief overview of clientelism and Mexican politics, then 
go on to present our hypotheses about clientelism. Next we 
explain the types of survey instruments used to determine 
how citizens think about the job of legislators, and how we 
measure the socioeconomic status of survey respondents. 
We then present our findings from non-experimental ques-
tions and from experiments embedded within the survey 
and provide an assessment of how citizens in Mexico City 
view the job of a legislator. We conclude by exploring what 
this preliminary study indicates for studying clientelism 
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and democratization, as well as for developing mass public 
affective support for democratic institutions.
2. Clientelism and how people 
view the job of legislators
Literature that explores when people will vote based 
on clientelistic benefits instead of policy predicts that peo-
ple will vote for the benefit provider as long as the benefit 
(i.e., a handout, help with a personal problem, a service for 
the community) is of value to the voter (Desposato, 2001; 
Lyne, 2007; Taylor-Robinson, 2010). Thus, a person who 
has the means to take care of their own and their family’s 
basic needs (e.g., pay for a doctor’s appointment, obtain a 
job, provide adequate food and shelter) is not expected to 
exchange their vote for clientelistic benefits. In essence, a 
middle class person could vote for a patron in exchange for 
a service, but the patron (politician or party) is unlikely to 
use a clientelistic strategy to try to attract middle class votes 
because it would be very costly to provide targetable benefits 
that would be of value to wealthier voters (see Calvo and 
Murillo, 2004; Hagopian, 2009). Poor people may also vote 
in exchange for clientelistic benefits because they devalue 
policy benefits that are uncertain to help them directly and 
will be implemented in the distant future.
Research also shows that clientelistic practices will 
be prevalent where one party has a political monopo-
ly (Magaloni et al., 2007; Medina and Stokes, 2007). The 
electorate will vote for the ruling party so long as the party 
continues to deliver benefits and favours, and there are 
no credible alternatives. New parties are less reliable for 
voters because they cannot usually keep campaign promi-
ses (Keefer, 2005; Keefer and Vlaicu, 2005). Moreover, the 
established party can punish districts that did not support 
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them in the past election by withholding monies or services. 
Under such circumstances it is in the best interests of the 
electorate, especially poor voters, to continue to support 
the dominant party, whether or not they like their poli-
tics. Thus, if new parties want to make inroads against the 
traditional party in a new democracy, at least with poor 
people, they must find ways to provide clientelistic benefits 
(Roberts, 2002, p. 9; Stokes, 2005). To gain access to votes, 
new parties may use local patrons who have credibility 
with voters (Keefer, 2005; Keefer and Vlaicu, 2005; Scott, 
1969). These patrons can help provide the goods and be-
nefits voters have come to expect in such political settings, 
and clientelism may be the norm for citizens even though 
democracy is taking hold.
2.1. Clientelism in Mexican politics
Mexico is an interesting case for studying citizens’ 
attitudes about the job of legislators. Clientelism has long 
been important in Mexican politics and Mexico was go-
verned for over 70 years by the PRI, which governed with 
an authoritarian regime that regularly held elections.7 
Unlike many Latin American countries that experienced 
repeated military rule, often closing down the legislature 
and making political parties illegal, Mexico was governed 
by a civilian party that maintained a façade of democracy. 
The PRI manipulated legislatures, elections, and even the 
opposition parties, but legislatures were always elected 
and in operation (Cornelius, 1996).
Clientelism helped the PRI to maintain the support 
of poor voters, and to recruit ambitious politicians. By 
7 Fox (1994) described clientelism in Mexico during the long period of 
the PRI’s hegemony as producing “political subordination in exchange 
for material rewards” where the poor were obliged “to sacrifice their 
political rights if they want access to distributive resources” (pp.152-153). 
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deterring voters from exiting the patron-client relationship 
with threats of benefit retraction (jobs, income subsidies, 
local infrastructure projects), the PRI was able to assure 
itself hegemonic rule (Magaloni et al., 2007).8 For ambitious 
politicians, this meant that staying loyal to the PRI was 
the way to advance their careers. The PRI controlled re-
cruitment by operating as a highly centralized organization 
where one’s reputation within the party as a loyal PRIista 
meant more for advancement than one’s reputation with 
the electorate (Nacif, 2002; Langston, 2008).9 The need to 
build a political career through the party was enhanced by 
Mexico’s ban on reelection. Mexican legislators are always 
looking for their next elected, bureaucratic, or party post 
(Langston and Aparicio, 2008).
The PRI modified electoral institutions when neces-
sary to maintain their ability to control policy, and to keep 
other parties participating in the system. These changes 
did not, however, end clientelistic practices (Molinar and 
Weldon, 2001). State and national legislators are elected via 
a mixed-member system where parties nominate candida-
tes to stand for election in single-member districts, as well 
as party lists of candidates that are elected from a single 
state-wide district for state legislatures, or via 5 sub-national 
districts for the lower chamber of the national congress. The 
single-member districts are won by plurality. Over time ge-
nuine opposition parties –in particular the National Action 
(PAN) and Democratic Revolution (PRD) parties began to 
win more seats. The opposition became more militant in 
its demands and the PRI recognized that it had to make 
8 The PRI still is known to use such tactics in states and municipalities 
where it is still the dominant party (Cleary and Stokes, 2006, p.52).
9 As the PRI’s hegemony waned, the party gave more control over nomina-
tions to governors and former governors, and they selected more candi-
dates for the legislature with careers rooted in local politics, though these 
more local candidates were still party loyalists (Langston, 2008, p. 150).
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concessions (Eisenstadt, 2003). The PRI’s decreasing voter 
support became obvious in 1997 when it lost its majority 
in the national congress, and regime change was clear in 
2000 when the PRI lost the presidential election.
During the long period of PRI hegemony, the PRI’s 
presidents benefited from a largely compliant Congress. 
As the effective head of the PRI, presidents were able to 
get their initiatives passed even though they did not enjoy 
remarkable formal powers over the Congress (Casar, 2002). 
PRI governors had similar power in state governments (Solt, 
2004; Langston, 2008). When Zedillo of the PRI was elected 
president in 1994, he responded to critics by supporting 
primary elections to determine who would run in future 
elections and denouncing his role as party leader. These 
moves effectively undermined the loyalty the executive 
needed from members of Congress to fulfill their agenda 
goals. Since the PRI could no longer guarantee political 
careers for party loyalists, more politicians started to switch 
parties, and it became possible for legislatures to gain 
strength relative to executives. There have also been op-
portunities for state legislatures to check governors, though 
there is “considerable variation in the style and apparent 
willingness to ‘let go’ on the part of the state executive” 
(Ward and Rodríguez, 1999, p. 690).
In the last 10+ years much has changed in Mexican 
party politics and executive-legislative relations, yet it is not 
clear how much of this change was being communicated to 
voters who had seen the Mexican government dominated 
by strong presidents for decades. There are more party 
options, but clientelism still plays a role for seeking the 
votes of poor voters. With the installation of competitive 
democracy, the PAN and PRD also provide clientelistic 
benefits (Hilgers, 2008, Greene, 2001). Why would citizens 
expect the legislature to start overseeing the executive 
given the long history of legislatures acting subservient 
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to the executive?10 Why would voters reward deputies for 
checking the executive or for legislating independently if 
such activity meant the deputy lost access to clientelistic 
resources they could deliver to constituents? Nacif (2002) 
argues that what was a single centralized party model in 
Mexico has become a centralized multiparty system where 
party loyalty is now assured by similar methods as before; 
to advance to other seats or jobs party members need to 
support the party line (also see Weldon, 2002).
Given this history and the ongoing system of patro-
nage and use of clientelism, it is not clear how citizens in 
Mexico’s new democracy develop their expectations of their 
elected officials. The rationale for poor people to place a 
positive utility on clientelistic benefits that are immediate 
and certain compared to legislation or checking the exe-
cutive whose benefits to them are uncertain, indicates 
that poor people could still prefer clientelism over other 
types of behaviors by deputies even with the installation of 
democracy. Rational choice theory melded with literature 
on clientelism predicts that it is people who can provide 
for their own immediate needs who can afford to reward 
politicians and parties for working on policy whose benefit 
is uncertain and likely to be slow to arrive (Kitschelt, 2000; 
Desposato, 2001). Thus we hypothesize:
H1: Poor people will be more likely than those who are 
better off to view the job of legislators as helping individuals 
with their problems.
10 There is evidence that the news media gives coverage to the new work 
being done by at least some legislatures. Solt (2004, p. 161) explains how 
newspapers and TV in Michoacán began to cover the work of legisla-
tors and committees after the PRI lost control of the government in the 
2001 election. However, we don’t know who pays attention to this type 
of news and media attention could correlate with SES.
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H2: People of higher socioeconomic status will be 
more likely than those who are less well off to view the job 
of legislators as developing laws.
3. The 2008 mexico City Survey: An overview
In July 2008 an original survey was administered to 800 
residents in the Federal District of Mexico (Mexico City).11 
All seventeen delegaciones of Mexico City were sampled.12 
Survey questions were designed to determine what it is 
citizens think elected deputies are supposed to do in a 
democracy. We use education attainment as a proxy for 
the socioeconomic status of respondents. Education levels 
proved to be a more reliable measure in our survey than 
reported income since all but two respondents reported 
their years and type of education, while 221 (27.6%) did not 
answer the question about income. In addition education is 
a theoretically relevant measure as, “Inadequate education 
is one of the most powerful determinants of poverty” (Aoki 
et al., 2002, p. 223; also Psacharopoulos, 1994),13 and poverty 
creates conditions where clientelistic benefits are likely to 
be perceived as a rational exchange for electoral support.
11 The survey was funded by Texas A&M University’s Scholarly and Creative 
Enhancement Program, and carried out by Data OPM (www.dataopm.
net). 
12 Eighty sampling points were selected by a proportional to size proce-
dure from the IFE’s electoral districts. Five interviews were conducted 
in two “manzanas” in each sampling point. Households were selected 
by systematic randomization and then the adult in the household with 
the most recent birthday was asked to take the survey. 
13 The Poverty Reduction Strategies Sourcebook (2002) by the World Bank 
provides an in-depth discussion of various indicators of poverty includ-
ing education, income, health indicators and consumption measures 
(web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY).
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We divide education attainment into three categories. 
The low category includes those respondents who indi-
cated that they have no formal education or who did not 
complete elementary school (n=83), the middle category 
ranged from those who completed elementary school to 
those who completed high school (n=544), and the high 
category ranges from some university classes to graduate 
work (n=171). Since we are interested in determining if the 
least educated view the work of representatives differently 
than the more educated and the highly educated, these 
categories conservatively capture socioeconomic status 
(SES) differences among survey respondents. Based on 
the clientelism literature, we expect people with the least 
education to value what we will refer to as “clientelistic 
representation” (see Desposato, 2001).
Data from the National Statistics and Geography 
Institute (INEGI) in 2005 shows that approximately 10% of 
the Mexico City population does not complete elementary 
school and 66% of the population ranges from completing 
elementary school to completing high school. This indicates 
that our categories are an appropriate representation of 
the population’s education levels with 10% of our survey 
population indicating that they had not completed ele-
mentary school and 68% completing primary school to 
completing high school.
4. What traditional survey questions tell us 
about people’s expectations of officials
Table 2 lists survey questions that ask respondents 
about the type of work deputies are supposed to do once 
they are elected. As explained above, based on the cliente-
lism literature we predict that people with very low levels 
of education will want elected officials to help them with 
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personal or community needs. In contrast, people with 
more education will have expectations of deputies that 
are more in line with the “civics” view of the job of elected 
representatives since they will be more likely to have the 
capacity to address their own needs.
As expected level of education has a significant effect 
on mean clientelism in the responses to the three questions. 
In general, the trends imply that the higher the education 
of the respondent the lower is the expectation for cliente-
lism of the deputy. To be conservative in our analyses we 
performed Scheffe posteriori contrasts to identify statis-
tically significant differences among the three education 
groups. For Q10 (writing laws vs. obtaining resources for 
the community) and Q11 (supervise the governor vs. help 
individuals with personal problems) there is no statisti-
cal difference in clientelism between the low and middle 
education group. However, for Q10 both these groups are 
higher in expectation of clientelism than the university 
education group (p<0.10 for the low vs. university education 
comparison, p<0.01 for the middle vs. university educa-
tion comparison). For Q11 the middle education group is 
significantly different from the university education group 
(p=0.06). Overall this supports our clientelism hypothesis, 
but it indicates that the education cut-point is at a higher 
level of education than anticipated. For Q50 (legislate vs. 
maintain contact with people in the district), the mean 
response is highest (most clientelistic) for the low education 
group, as predicted by our clientelism hypothesis, and the 
posteriori contrast (Scheffe) between the low education 
group and the other two education groups is statistically 
significant (p<0.05 for the difference between the low and 
medium education groups, p<0.10 for the low and high 
education groups).
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Table 2. Perceptions of the proper 
job of elected legislators*
Question Mean loweduc group
Mean
middle 
educ 
group
Mean
univ 
educ 
group
F test 
for Main 
Effect (sig-
nificance)
Total 
N
(Q10) In your opinion, the 
job of a deputy is to write 
laws or to obtain resou-
rces for projects in your 
community? 
1.58 1.56 1.43 5.03 (.01) 774
(Q11) In your opinion, the 
job of a state deputy is to 
supervise the governor or 
to help individuals with 
personal problems?
1.45 1.48 1.38 2.79 (.06) 769
(Q50) There are people 
who say that the job of a 
deputy is to legislate while 
other people say that 
the job of a deputy is to 
maintain contact with the 
people in his or her dis-
trict. What phrase is closer 
to your opinion? 
1.54 1.4 1.4 3.14 (.04) 765
* Responses of “legislate” or “supervise the executive” coded 
1 (i.e., the “civics” response), “clientelism” response coded 2. 
Responses of “both are the job of a deputy” were coded 1 as well 
because it includes the civics response.
In sum, we learn from these questions that people with 
little or no education are more likely than those with university-
level schooling to think that the “job of a deputy is to obtain 
resources for projects in their community”, “help individuals 
with personal problems,” or “maintain contact with the people 
in his or her district.” The middle education category is more 
variable in its clientelistic tendencies. They favor a deputy 
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providing local and particularistic service, but are more like 
those in the highest education category when asked about 
whether deputies should maintain contact with the people in 
their district. Based on what we learn from these traditional 
survey questions it appears that state legislators were correct 
to be concerned that some types of citizens view them more 
as “little mayors” than as legislators, and do not have a view of 
the job of deputies that is compatible with the legislating and 
oversight aspects of their job as defined by the constitution.
5. Survey embedded experiments and what 
they indicate about citizens’ expectations
To enhance our understanding of whether and how 
SES impacts citizens’ expectation of politics we embedded 
experiments within the survey. The controlled manipulation 
of scenarios enables us to assess the respondents’ sensitivity 
to clientelism and provides a fine tuned test of our hypothe-
ses that attenuates effects of social desirability in responses.
The treatments of clientelism were embedded in two 
separate experiments –each targeting a distinct political 
context. The first dealt with behavior of a candidate during 
the campaign; the second experiment with the behavior of a 
deputy in office. The experiments were embedded in diffe-
rent parts of the survey questionnaire. Each experiment was 
structured as a between-group design and the respondents 
of each education group were randomly assigned to one of 
the clientelism scenarios. The experiments were designed 
as randomized complete block experiments with multiple 
replications per block and factorially related treatments. 
There were 12 or 18 replications per block, depending on 
the experiment, and 22 blocks totaling 800 experimental 
units. Treatments of the experiments of each block of 36 
questionnaires were present in all possible combinations 
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so that there was not systematic interaction possible among 
the various experimental treatments.
5.1. Experiment I: Clientelism During the Campaign
Since in Mexico deputies cannot be reelected candi-
dates are rarely able to establish a personal reputation with 
the electorate (Nacif, 2002). Consequently, candidates rely 
on their nominating party’s resources and standing in their 
home municipalities to win a campaign and it is during 
campaigns when much clientelism occurs. For example, a 
wealthy community leader could sponsor a campaign event 
for a candidate. During the campaign event, there may be 
medical personnel available to see some of the neediest 
community members, and bags of concrete may be made 
available to participants. Such benefits are clientelistic in 
nature and though they are technically not coming from 
the candidate or a party directly, they are designed to in-
centivize voters to support the event’s candidate of choice.
The first experiment was designed to provide insight 
into what people in a young democracy with a history of 
clientelistic politics expect candidates to do during elections. 
Education groups (the proxy for respondent’s SES) are the 
same as in the analysis of the non-experimental questions.
In this campaign experiment, respondents were read one 
of three scenarios (See Appendix A for full text). Scenario 1: 
a deputy candidate for the Mexico City legislature visits the 
respondent’s community and gives a speech about a bill he 
will propose if elected to expand the public high school in 
the district (‘bill’ condition). Scenario 2: the candidate gives 
the same speech, but during the campaign event there is also 
an opportunity for attendees to receive free services from a 
medical specialist, and party members distribute construc-
tion materials and bags of food (‘bill and goodies’ condition). 
Scenario 3: the party provides an opportunity for free services 
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from a medical specialist and distributes construction ma-
terials and bags of food and there is no mention of any bills 
the candidate would propose if elected (‘goodies’ condition).
Respondents were then asked: “In the story that was 
just read, please select one or more of the following options 
that in your opinion describes correctly what occurred in 
the story.” Answer options were: (1) the candidate gave a 
speech about a bill, (2) building materials and groceries 
were distributed, (3) there were free medical services. If 
the respondent did not correctly answer this manipulation 
check question they were excluded from the analysis.14 Then 
they answered three questions that ask if, given the scena-
rio they were read, they consider the activities described 
in the scenario as correct, if they were satisfied with such 
activities, and if the activities were appropriate for a can-
didate, creating three dependent variables in our analysis.
The campaign experiment thus has a 3 x 3 design, 
with the 3 treatment scenarios and the 3 education groups. 
However, it is also possible to analyze this experiment as a 
2 x 3 design, analyzing the two “pure” treatments: where 
the candidate only talks about the bill at the campaign 
event versus where the campaign event only hands out 
goodies. Results are similar for the 3 x 3 and 2 x 3 designs, 
but are cleaner and sharper on the 2 x 3 design, which is 
reasonable since the middle treatment is a hybrid (bill + 
goodies). The 3 x 3 design decreases the power of rejecting 
the null hypothesis, so results are less conclusive, but they 
are in the right pattern. Therefore, we report here the 2 x 3 
analysis (findings of the 3 x 3 analysis are in Appendix B).
The scale for all dependent variables ranges from 1 to 2. 
Lower scores imply higher level of correctness, satisfaction, 
14 Sixty-six percent (165) responded correctly for scenario #1, 21% (56) for 
scenario #2, and 67% (177) for scenario #3. Correlation with respondent 
education was only 0.08.
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or appropriateness. We find that across the three education 
levels the candidate’s different behavior (providing goodies 
or planning to introduce a new bill) comes close to meeting 
traditional significance levels in its effect on respondents’ 
perception of the extent of its correctness [F(1, 336)=2.58 p = 
.11], and the approval is higher for the bill (mean=1.25) than 
for the clientelistic behavior (mean=1.36). Level of education 
yielded a significant effect [F(2, 336)=3.01 p = .05], and approval 
is higher, regardless of the treatment, as education decreases 
(mean= 1.20 for low education respondents, 1.30 for respon-
dents with a medium level of education, 1.42 for respondents 
with university education). The interaction of education and the 
treatment is also significant [F(2, 336)=2.82 p = .06]. As predicted 
by our hypothesis, respondents in the lowest education group 
have a more favorable view of the correctness of clientelistic 
behavior (mean=1.12) than of legislative behavior (mean=1.27), 
and the reverse is true for respondents with middle (means of 
1.39 for clientelistic behavior, and 1.22 for the bill) or university 
levels of education (mean of 1.58 and 1.26). As can be seen in 
Figure 1, all education groups have an almost equal evaluation 
of bill behavior, yet the results suggest that people with lower 
education tend more than others to accept the ‘legitimacy’ 
of the candidate’s actions, and that this is particularly true 
for clientelistic behavior. By contrast, as education increases 
people find clientelistic behavior objectionable.
The second measure addressed how satisfied respon-
dents would feel with regard to the pure types of candidate’s 
activities depicted in the scenarios. Again, the treatment is 
significant [F(1, 329)=6.19 p = .01], mean=1.34 for the bill, 
mean=1.53 for goodies. This indicates that respondents had 
a more positive reaction to bills than to clientelism. The level 
of education had no statistical effect on the extent of satis-
faction, nor did it statistically interact with the treatment.
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Figure 1. Interaction of treatment and education in 
Experiment 1 with “correctness” dependent variable*
* Respondents who thought the treatment (“bill” or “goodies”) was 
correct were coded 1. Respondents who thought the treatment 
was incorrect were coded 2.
For the appropriate dependent variable again the main 
effect of the treatment was significant [F(1, 324)=4.55 p=.03], 
and again the bill was more favorably evaluated (mean=1.37) 
than clientelistic behavior (mean=1.54). People in the low 
education category overall had a more favorable evaluation 
of the candidate (mean=1.38, 1.46, 1.53 for low, middle, 
university education respectively), though the main effect 
of education was not significant [F(2, 324)=1.15 p=.32]. The 
education / treatment interaction was not significant (p=.21).
This first experiment yields several interesting findings. 
First, legislative behavior (discussion of a bill) is more favo-
rably evaluated than clientelistic behavior (distribution of 
goodies). This lends evidence to the internal validity of the 
experiment as the respondents were sensitive to the varia-
tions in the scenarios and reacted to them. Second, for all 
Revista LatinoameRicana de opinión púbLica / númeRo 1 167
three dependent variables we find a lack of preference for 
goodies and respondents always find their provision objec-
tionable. Especially with the “correct behavior” dependent 
variable, goodies are most strongly objected to by well edu-
cated people. How much people resent outright clientelistic 
behavior appears to be a function of education. Yet people 
with little education overall give the politicians –regardless 
of behavior– a more favorable evaluation than do people 
with more education (see Table 3). People with little edu-
cation thus appear to be less critical of what politicians do.
Table 3. Mean Response Values for 3 Dependent 
Variables by Education & Treatment (Candidate 
Experiment) (Low values indicate greater approval)
Bill Goodies
Little to no education
CORRECT 1.27 1.12
SATISFIED 1.30 1.35
APPROPRIATE 1.40 1.35
Medium education
CORRECT 1.22 1.39
SATISFIED 1.35 1.55
APPROPRIATE 1.35 1.55
University education
CORRECT 1.26 1.58
SATISFIED 1.36 1.68
APPROPRIATE 1.36 1.70
Overall from this experiment we conclude cautiously 
that people in Mexico City are saying ‘do not bribe me with 
goodies –it is too obvious.’ But this signal is most clear and 
strong from people with a high level of education. This 
could be because they are not benefiting from the clien-
telistic goodies that are distributed in the scenario –such 
goodies are not valuable to a person who is well off, as is 
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likely for a person with extensive education. These findings 
from the experiment are in line overall with the findings of 
the traditional survey questions presented in the previous 
section. In the experiment we find that poor people do not 
view distribution of goodies as incorrect, but well educated 
people disapprove of clientelism. The middle education 
group is the group for whom it is most difficult to define 
their needs, and they are also the group with the biggest 
variance in how they respond to clientelism, both in the 
experiment and in the traditional survey questions (see 
tables 2 and 3).
5.2. Experiment II: Work by a Deputy in the Legislature
The second experiment explored respondents’ ex-
pectations of officials once they are in the legislature. This 
experiment included two scenarios regarding the activities 
of a deputy, with the respondents randomly assigned to 
the experimental treatments (see Appendix A for the full 
text). Scenario 1: the deputy is busy working on several 
legislative committees and does not have time to visit his 
local constituents. Scenario 2: the deputy has the same 
committee duties but also maintains a local office where 
three assistants are available to help constituents with 
requests. After being read a scenario respondents were 
asked: “In the story that was just read, please select one 
or more of the following options that in your opinion des-
cribes correctly what occurred in the story:” (1) the depu-
ty works on committees in the congress, (2) the deputy 
has an office in your community with assistants who help 
people.15 Respondents were then asked if they think that 
15 317 survey participants correctly answered the manipulation check ques-
tion: 230 (58%) who had received scenario #1 (committee work only), and 
87 (22%) for scenario #2 (committee + local office). Education level was not 
related to whether respondents answered the manipulation check correctly 
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the work the deputy is doing is correct, if they are satisfied 
with the deputy’s activities, and if they think these activities 
are appropriate. We explored reactions of the same three 
education groups to these two experimental scenarios, so 
the experiment has a 2 x 3 design.
The first analysis is of the perceived correctness of the 
deputy’s behavior. The scale for all dependent variables ran-
ges from 1 to 2. Lower scores imply higher level of correctness, 
satisfaction, or appropriateness. Approval evaluations are 
higher for the committee work treatment (mean=1.32) than 
for the committee work + local office treatment (mean=1.49), 
[F(1, 304)=3.85 p<.05]. The education level of respondents 
does not have a significant main effect or interaction (F<1.0) 
with the treatment for predicting how respondents evaluated 
the work of the deputy. All respondents appear to expect 
that once elected, the deputy should focus on committee 
work –they are not expecting the elected official to return to 
the community. This finding is contrary to our clientelism 
hypothesis and is unexpected given the consistent effect 
of education found in the non-experimental questions, in 
particular question Q50 (see Table 2). However, the two 
experimental scenarios are not suggestive of any direct dis-
tribution of “goodies” to the people so it is plausible that the 
concept of clientelism is not salient.
When we asked respondents whether they were satisfied 
with the deputy’s behavior, the analysis indicates that the 
treatment, education, and the treatment*education interaction 
are all not significant. Still, the mean responses across edu-
cation categories show that people in the low and medium 
education categories are more satisfied with committee work 
(mean= 1.43 for low education, 1.55 for medium education) 
than with committee work + community office (mean=1.71 for 
(correlation<.01). As in the first experiment, respondents who did not cor-
rectly answer the manipulation check were excluded from the analysis. 
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low education, 1.65 for medium education). In contrast, people 
with university education have a similar level of satisfaction 
with either behavior (mean=1.63 for committee work alone, 
1.60 for committee work + community office) (see Table 4).
Table 4. Mean Response Values for 3 Dependent 
Variables by Education & Treatment (Committee Work 
Experiment) (Low values indicate greater approval)
Committee Work Committee Work + Local Office
Little to no education
CORRECT 1.25 1.43
SATISFIED 1.43 1.71
APPROPRIATE 1.58 1.57
Medium education
CORRECT 1.33 1.54
SATISFIED 1.55 1.64
APPROPRIATE 1.58 1.81
University education
CORRECT 1.39 1.50
SATISFIED 1.63 1.60
APPROPRIATE 1.71 1.55
Our analysis of the appropriateness of the deputy’s depic-
ted behavior demonstrates an interaction effect of education 
and the experimental treatments [F(2, 281)=3.84 p<.03]. 
For those with low education, it does not matter whether 
the deputy has an office in the community (1.57) or is busy 
with legislative work (1.58). Respondents with a middle le-
vel of education actually prefer that the deputy will be busy 
legislating (1.58) to the option of combining legislating and 
a having an office in the community (1.81). Respondents 
with university education, however, tend to favor the “dual” 
responsibility (legislating and community office) (1.55) more 
than “pure” legislating (1.71) (see Figure 2).
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The findings from this second experiment indicate 
that well educated respondents expect the deputy to have 
an office in the district. Perhaps well-educated people do 
not view a district office as “clientelistic behavior”, but as 
“representation.” People in the middle and low education 
groups did not have such a favorable evaluation of a deputy 
combining committee work + a district office. This difference 
across education groups may reflect respondents’ different 
levels of knowledge about the job of a deputy, which we 
discuss further below.
Figure 2. Interaction of treatment and education in 
Experiment 2 with “appropriate” dependent variable*
* Respondents who thought the treatment (“committee” or “com-
mittee plus community”) was appropriate were coded 1. Respon-
dents who thought the treatment was inappropriate were coded 2.
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6. Conclusion
We used both traditional survey questions and em-
bedded experiments to begin to understand how the mass 
public views the job of members of the legislature. Across 
Latin America congresses are held in low regard, and inter-
views with state legislators in Mexico indicate that part of the 
reason people lack esteem for congress and deputies is that 
people do not understand the job of a deputy. Particularly 
in a country where politics has historically been based on 
clientelism more than on policies, and where the legislative 
branch bowed to the dictates of the executive, why should 
citizens understand the type of work deputies are supposed 
to do in a democratic regime? Rather than developing or 
investigating policy initiatives, or checking the power of 
the executive, the theory of clientelism would lead us to 
expect that people living in a young democracy would 
regard deputies as a source of connection to government 
and of particularistic and community benefits.
With our survey of 800 residents of Mexico City we 
found that poor people are more likely than people who 
are better off to view clientelistic behavior as a deputy’s 
job, which supports expectations derived from cliente-
lism literature. People with a high level of education view 
legislating and oversight of the executive as a deputy’s job, 
and they have a much more negative view of clientelistic 
behavior. People in the middle of the education spectrum 
have less consistent attitudes about what a deputy should 
do. However, the embedded experiments indicate that even 
for people with no or very little education, their views are 
more subtle, and more democratic than would be predicted 
by clientelism theory.
An important difference between the traditional survey 
questions and the experimental scenarios is that in the 
traditional questions the respondent has to contrast two 
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specific behaviors –one more clientelistic and the other 
more legislative. Due to social desirability, such traditional 
survey questions increase almost artificially the sensitivity 
of respondents to the two options because they have to 
pick one. But politics in real life does not always present 
a citizen with two contrasting options from which they 
must pick the one they prefer. In reality a citizen goes to a 
political rally, or hears about a political event, and responds 
to the rally they attend or hear about. So the structure of 
the experiment can give us cleaner, more valid results in 
terms of how people react to what happens in the rally. We 
found that people do not react well to goodies. Even people 
with little education tend to have a favorable evaluation 
of the rally where the candidate talks about a bill and no 
goodies are distributed. They are the people the Mexican 
state legislators thought had the least understanding of the 
job of a deputy, yet they reacted favorably to bill discussion 
(experiment 1) and committee work (experiment 2).
Another issue pointed to by the findings of this re-
search is that education is not only a proxy for wealth, 
or the likelihood that a respondent will place a positive 
value on clientelistic goodies, but it is also an indicator of 
how much knowledge citizens may have about democra-
cy. Survey participants with more education, particularly 
with university education, are likely to have been taught 
about politics or about philosophical concepts such as 
democracy. If so, they may not simply be reacting to the 
lack of value for themselves of the clientelistic goodies, 
but reacting to the clientelistic behavior as undemocratic, 
or as clashing with their view of what democracy should 
be. We noted that people with a high level of education 
formed the group that was most favorable to the deputy 
having a district office along with doing committee work. 
Highly educated citizens may view presence in the district, 
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or accessibility of officials as part of representation, and not 
as clientelistic behavior.
Studies have shown that people with higher levels of 
education participate in politics at a higher rate in Mexico, 
as in the United States (Klesner 2003; Brady et al. 1995). 
But most people in Mexico, or in other Latin American 
countries, do not have a university education. According 
to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA), in 2006 Mexico’s turnout rate was just 
over 60%. Though the more highly educated citizens, about 
25% of the population in Mexico City, may be (and in our 
survey results appear to be) more aware of the type of work 
democratically elected representatives are supposed to do 
once they take office, most votes are cast by people with 
less education –people who may see distribution of clien-
telistic benefits as valuable even if they are viewed as no 
more appropriate than legislating. If the expected utility of 
legislation is low to poor people, they may give politicians 
who engage in clientelistic behavior a favorable evaluation 
because the immediate benefit of clientelistic goodies is 
useful to them. However, we found that people with little 
education –those who would be most expected to devalue 
legislation as of little concrete benefit to themselves– gave an 
equally favorable evaluation to bills and to goodies for two 
of the three dependent variables in experiment 1. They also 
gave a more favorable evaluation to the deputy working on 
committees than combining a district office with committee 
work in experiment 2. Thus it appears that while they are 
willing to view old-fashioned clientelistic behavior from 
politicians as “correct”, they also express a “democratic” 
attitude by approving of legislating, indicating that they 
may have a greater understanding of the job of deputies in 
a democratic system than the deputies themselves realize. 
More studies, examining the attitudes of citizens in different 
institutional settings and with different political histories 
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will further our understanding of what different categories 
of citizens expect of their officials, and whether expectations 
line up with the type(s) of representation institutions give 
career-seeking politicians incentives to provide. Opening 
up the black box of citizen-government relations as filtered 
by different types of institutions is an important frontier in 
understanding the consolidation phase of democratization.
Bibliography
Aoki, Aya; Bruns, Barbara; Drabble, Michael; Marope, 
Mmantsetsa; Mingat, Alain; Moock Peter; Murphy, 
Patrick; Paci, Pierella; Patrinos, Harry; Tan, Jee-
Peng; Thomas, Christopher; Winter, Carolyn; and 
Yang, Hongyu (2002), “Education”, Poverty Reduction 
Strategies Sourcebook, Washington DC, World Bank, 
pp. 231-275.
Brady, Henry E.; Verba, Sidney; and Lehman Scholozman, 
Kay (1995), “Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political 
Participation”, American Political Science Review, 89 
(2), pp. 271-94.
Calvo, Ernesto and Murillo, Maria Victoria (2004), “Who 
Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral 
Market”, American Journal of Political Science, 48 (4), 
pp. 742-757.
Casar, Ma. Amparo (2002), “Executive-Legislative Relations: 
The Case of Mexico (1946-1997)”, in Scott Morgenstern 
and Benito Nacif (eds.), Legislative Politics in Latin 
America, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 114-144.
Cleary, Matthew R. and Stokes, Susan C. (2006), Democracy 
and the Culture of Skepticism: Political Trust in 
Argentina and Mexico, New York, Russell Sage.
176 Revista LatinoameRicana de opinión púbLica / númeRo 1
Cornelius, Wayne A. (1996), Mexican Politics in Transition: 
The Breakdown of a One-Party-Dominant Regime, La 
Jolla, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of 
California.
Desposato, Scott W. (2001), Institutional Theories, Societal 
Realities, and Party Politics in Brazil, Ph.D. thesis, Los 
Angeles, University of California.
Easton, David (1975), “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of 
Political Support”, British Journal of Political Science, 
5 (4), pp. 435-457.
Eisenstadt, Todd (2003), Courting Democracy in Mexico: 
Party Strategies and Electoral Institutions, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press.
Fox, Jonathan (1994), “The Difficult Transition from 
Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico”, World 
Politics, 46, pp. 151-184.
Greene, Kenneth F. (2001), “Against the Machine: Party 
Organization and Clientelistic Politics in Mexico”, paper 
presented at the Conference on Citizen-Elite, Linkages in 
Democratic Politics, Duke University, March 30-April 1.
Hagopian, Frances (2009), “Parties and Politicians in Latin 
America: Polarization, Program and Patronage in 
the Post-Reform Era”, paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 
Chicago, IL, April 2-5.
Hilgers, Tina (2008), “Causes and Consequences of Political 
Clientelism: Mexico’s PRD in Comparative Perspective”, 
Latin American Politics and Society, 50 (4), pp. 123-153.
Keefer, Philip (2005), “Democratization and Clientelism: 
Why are Young Democracies Badly Governed?”, World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3594 (May).
Keefer, Philip and Razvan Vlaicu (2005), “Democracy, 
Credibility, and Clientelism”, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 3472.
Revista LatinoameRicana de opinión púbLica / númeRo 1 177
Kitschelt, Herbert (2000), “Linkages between Citizens 
and Politicians in Democratic Politics”, Comparative 
Political Studies, 33 (6/7), pp. 845-879.
Kitschelt, Herbert and Wilkinson, Steven I. (2007), “A re-
search agenda for the study of citizen-politician linkag-
es and democratic accountability”, in Herbert Kitschelt 
and Steven I. Wilkinson (eds.), Patrons, Clients, and 
Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and 
Political Competition, New York, Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 322-343.
Klesner, J. L. (2003), “Political Attitudes, Social Capital, and 
Political Participation: The United States and Mexico 
Compared”, Mexican Studies / Estudios Mexicanos, 19 
(1), pp. 29-63.
Lagos, Marta (2003), “Public Opinion”, in Jorge I. Domínguez 
and Michael Shifter (eds.), Constructing Democratic 
Governance in Latin America, second edition, 
Baltimore, MD, The John Hopkins University Press, 
pp. 137-161.
Langston, Joy (2008), “Legislative Recruitment in Mexico”, in 
Peter Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern (eds.), Pathways 
to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection 
in Latin America, State College, PA, Pennsylvania State 
University Press, pp. 143-163.
Langston, Joy and Francisco Aparicio (2008), “Political 
Career Structures in Democratic Mexico, 1997-2006”, 
paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Boston, MA, August 28.
Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan (1996), “Toward Consolidated 
Democracies”, Journal of Democracy, 7 (2), pp. 14-33.
Lyne, Mona M. (2007), “Rethinking Economics and 
Institutions: the voter’s dilemma and democratic 
accountability”, in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. 
Wilkinson (eds.), Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns 
178 Revista LatinoameRicana de opinión púbLica / númeRo 1
of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition, 
Nueva York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 159-181.
Magaloni, Beatriz; Díaz-Cayeros, Alberto; and Estévez, 
Federico (2007), “Clientelism and Portfolio 
Diversification: A Model of Electoral Investment with 
Applications to Mexico”, in Herbert Kitschelt and 
Steven I. Wilkinson (eds.), Patrons, Clients, and Policies: 
Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political 
Competition, New York, Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 182-205.
Medina, Luis Fernando and Susan C. Stokes (2007), 
“Monopoly and monitoring: an approach to politi-
cal clientelism”, in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. 
Wilkinson (eds.), Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns 
of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition, 
New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 68-83.
Molinar Horcasitas, Juan and Jeffrey A. Weldon (2001), 
“Reforming Electoral Systems in Mexico”, in Matthew 
Soberg Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds.), Mixed-
Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 209-230.
Nacif, Benito (2002), “Understanding Party Discipline in 
the Mexican Chamber of Deputies: The Centralized 
Party Model”, in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif 
(eds.), Legislative Politics in Latin America, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 254-285.
Psacharopoulos, George (1994), “Returns to Education: 
A Global Update”, World Development, 22 (9), pp. 
1325-1343.
Roberts, Kenneth M. (2002), “Social Inequalities without 
Class Cleavages in Latin America’s Neoliberal Era”, 
Studies in Comparative International Development, 
36 (4), pp. 3-33.
Revista LatinoameRicana de opinión púbLica / númeRo 1 179
Scott, James C. (1969), “Corruption, machine politics, and 
political change”, American Political Science Review, 
62, pp. 1142-1158.
Solt, Frederick (2004), “Electoral Competition, Legislative 
Pluralism, and Institutional Development in Mexico: 
Evidence from Mexico’s States”, Latin American 
Research Review, 39 (1), pp. 155-167.
Stokes, Susan C. (2005), “Perverse Accountability: A 
Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from 
Argentina”, American Political Science Review, 99 (3), 
pp. 315-325.
Taylor-Robinson, Michelle M. (2010), Do the Poor Count? 
Democratic Institutions and Accountability in a 
Context of Poverty, University Park, Pennsylvania State 
University Press.
Ward, Peter M. and Victoria E. Rodríguez (1999), “New 
Federalism, Intra-governmental Relations and Co-
governance in Mexico”, Journal of Latin American 
Studies, 31, pp. 673-710.
Weldon, Jeffrey A. (2002), “The Legal and Partisan 
Framework of the Legislative Delegation of the Budget 
in Mexico”, In Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif 
(eds.), Legislative Politics in Latin America, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 377-411.
World Bank (2002), Poverty Reduction Strategies Sourcebook, 
Washington DC, World Bank.
Appendix A: Survey experiments
Experiment 1: a candidate running for the legislature
Scenario 1 (bill only): Jose Rodríguez is a deputy candi-
date for your district for the Mexico City legislature. During 
his campaign he visits with your community and gives a 
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speech about a bill he will propose if he is elected, to expand 
the public high school in your district
Scenario 2 (bill + goodies): Jose Rodríguez is a deputy 
candidate for your district for the Mexico City legislature. 
During his campaign he visits with your community and 
gives a speech about a bill he will propose if he is elected, 
to expand the public high school in your district. During 
the campaign event there is an opportunity for people at 
the event to obtain free services from a medical specialist, 
and members of the party distributed construction mate-
rials and bags of food
Scenario 3 (goodies only): Jose Rodríguez is a deputy 
candidate for your district for the Mexico City legislature. 
During his campaign he visits with your community. During 
the campaign event of Mr. Rodriguez there is an opportu-
nity for people at the event to obtain free services from a 
medical specialist, and members of the party distributed 
construction materials and bags of food.
Experiment 2: committee work by a 
member of the legislature
Scenario 1 (committee work only): Congressman 
Flores is the representative of your district. When the 
Congress is in session he dedicates every day of the week 
to work on different legislative committees. The deputy 
is President of the Finance Committee, Secretary of the 
Transportation Committee, and he is a member of the 
Agriculture Development Committee. Due to the quantity 
of work on the different committees, he does not have much 
time to visit his district.
Scenario 2 (committee work + district office): 
Congressman Flores is the representative of your district. 
When the Congress is in session he dedicates every day of 
the week to work on different legislative committees. The 
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deputy is President of the Finance Committee, Secretary of 
the Transportation Committee, and he is a member of the 
Agriculture Development Committee. Due to the quantity 
of work on the different committees, he does not have 
much time to visit his district. But the Congressman has 
an office in the community where 3 assistants are available 
to help people of the community with their problems and 
the assistants can fax Congressman Flores with requests 
from groups in the district.
Follow up questions used for each experiment:
1) “Correctness” dependent variable: Thinking about 
the story you were read, tell me if you are strongly in agree-
ment, somewhat in agreement, a little in agreement (all 
coded 1), or not at all in agreement (coded 2) with the 
following statement: This type of activity is correct for a 
candidate / legislator.
2) “Satisfied” dependent variable: Thinking about what 
you were read, are you satisfied with what the candidate / 
deputy did? (yes satisfied coded 1, no coded 2)
3) “Appropriate” dependent variable: Do you think 
that what occurred in the story you were read is the sort 
of thing that a candidate / legislator should do? (yes coded 
1, no coded 2)
Appendix B: Results of the 3 x 3 
analysis of experiment 1
“Correct” dependent variable: The results of the first 
experiment show across the three education levels that 
the candidate’s different behavior (providing goodies, in-
troducing a new bill, or both) did not affect respondents’ 
perception of the extent of its correctness [F(2, 389)=1.31 p 
= ns]. Level of education yielded a significant effect [F(2, 
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389)=3.49 p<.04], and lower education respondents had 
a higher perception of candidate’s correctness than did 
those with greater education regardless of the candidate’s 
behavior (1.18, 1.30, 1.41 for low, medium, high education 
respectively).
“Satisfied” dependent variable: We find a significant 
effect of the experimental treatment [F(2, 391)=3.58], but 
no effect for education [F(2, 391)=1.31 ns]. Either the bill 
alone (1.35) or in conjunction with goodies (1.36) were 
considered more satisfactory than the condition that des-
cribed only provision of goodies (1.56). In other words just 
offering clientelism is not satisfying. More so –the relative 
dislike of goodies was not associated with high education– 
but was evident across the board as the interaction of level 
of education and experimental treatment is not significant 
[F(4, 391)<1.00 ns].
“Appropriate” dependent variable: The 3 x 3 ANOVA on 
the appropriateness of the different candidate behaviors 
yielded patterns that are only at the verge of acceptable 
levels of statistical significance. Legislative behavior (bill 
only) was perceived as more appropriate (1.36) than bill 
+ goodies (1.45) and goodies only (1.57), across all educa-
tion levels [F(2, 385)=2.31 p<.10]. Respondents with lower 
education perceived all candidates’ behavior as more ap-
propriate (1.36) than middle (1.45) and higher education 
individuals (1.54), [F(2, 385)=2.09 p<.12]. The interaction 
of these factors is not significant (F<1.0).
